For two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities, I analyze a bargaining game under private information. I derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions-with and without side paymentsand when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations. While policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions, they create conflicts between the regions and, thus, delay. The results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation, and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial "uniformity assumption" traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature. (JEL C78, D72, D82, H77)
lead to delay. Centralization, if we rely on assumption (i), leads to uniformity but no delay. Hence, centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation exactly when uniformity outperforms differentiation, as analyzed in this paper.
The paper also contributes to the literature on bargaining under private information (surveyed by Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, and Raymond J. Deneckere 2002). In political bargaining, Alesina and Allan Drazen (1991) predict a war of attrition between groups trying to stabilize the economy. Giving in early reveals a high willingness to pay, and the proposal-maker is thus forced to bear most of the cost (ChangTai Hsieh 2000). Such inefficiencies often arise in bargaining under private information. I follow Anat R. Admati and Motty Perry (1987) and Cramton (1992) who endogenize the timing of offers, and allow each negotiator to delay before making its next offer. With two types and alternating offers, I get a simple, unique equilibrium, which actually implements the best "reasonable" mechanism. The possibility to delay is actually not crucial for the results below, since a region could alternatively signal by proposing an inefficient or less ambitious agreement. The conclusion that simple constraints, such as prohibiting side payments, in specified cases mitigate inefficiencies in bargaining is novel and relevant in many contexts, for example, for the debate on issue linkages (see, e.g., Roman Inderst 2000).
The next section presents the model of the economy and the bargaining game. Section II describes the equilibrium when side payments are not possible, and investigates when a uniform policy is beneficial. Section III repeats this exercise for the case with side payments, while Section IV compares the two cases and derives conditions under which side payments are good. Section V lays out the implications for international cooperation, fiscal federalism, and the uniformity assumption. Robustness is discussed in Section VI, while Section VII concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
I. The Model

A. The Economic Environment
Consider a typical situation with regional public goods. Region A's marginal value of the public good is vA, its contribution is measured by gA, and the marginal cost of contributing is normalized to one. The externality e denotes the fraction of A's contribution that "crosses the border" to the benefit of region B. Since symmetric assumptions are made for region B, the level of public good in region A is (1 -e)gA + egB. In addition, let s be a (possibly negative) side payment from B to A. The regional utility functions are:
( Since the utility functions are linear, the regions would like g to be infinitely large. But there are several reasons why g may be limited in reality. If g must be financed by local taxes or loans, and the sum of the tax bases is normalized to one, the budget constraint (when the regions can borrow from each other) is gA + g0 -1. This constraint will bind in equilibrium, so that in any agreement,9 (4) gA + gB = 1. 
B. The Bargaining Game
The bargaining game is quite standard. The two regions make alternating offers over (d, s), time is continuous, and the time horizon is infinite. A makes the first offer (d, s) E R2. If B rejects, B makes the next offer, and so on. An agreement is made as soon as one offer is accepted by the other region. Agreeing early is preferred to agreeing later, since i's present value of an agreement settled at time t is 5tui, where 6 < 1 is the regions' common discount factor. As is typically assumed, the minimum time between offers is small and approaching zero. However, I follow Admati and Perry (1987) and Cramton (1992) by relaxing the 9Without regional loans, an alternative assumption could be to let there be upper boundaries for regional contributions, gi 5 g,. This would lead, however, to an unrealistic bias toward uniformity, since the first best would simply require gi = gi, without capturing the intuition that the policy should be differentiated according to the vis in optimum. Kreps (1987) . This equilibrium is separating, and no pooling equilibria exist. The possibility of delaying is not crucial in the model, Section VI argues, because the regions may otherwise signal their types by proposing inefficiently "small" projects, g < 1. Under certain assumptions, this would give identical results. In the present model, however, signaling by proposing g < 1 is not an equilibrium, since it is cheaper to signal by delay.12 Section VI also discusses how the results may survive in more general bargaining models, and shows that no "reasonable" procedure (or mechanism) can do better than the bargaining game outlined here.
II. Without Side Payments: Uniform or Different Policies0
This section assumes that side payments are not possible. In the model, this is achieved by simply requiring s = 0. In international negotiations, side transfers may be impossible if the negotiating ministers have little discretion over other political variables. In federal unions, side payments may be difficult if tax rates must be the same across regions. In any case, the results provide a benchmark case, which will later be contrasted to the case with side payments (Section III) to evaluate the effect of the side payments themselves (Section IV).
A. The Outcome with Differentiation
This subsection presents the outcome under differentiation and explains how the negotiations will proceed. Without side payments, the regions bargain over d only. It is clearly attractive to be perceived as having a low value of the agreement, since the other region will then contribute more. With incomplete information, A wishes to pretend that it is of low type, even if this is false. To signal its reluctance credibly, a low-type A must delay in making an offer. The delay will be (exactly) so long that it would be too costly to afford for a high-type A.15 If -v is small but e and d' large, it is less attractive to contribute locally; pretending to be a low type is more attractive, and the necessary delay (6)- (7) is large. Since only low types will delay, the agreement is settled earlier if more regions value it highly. Note that the bargaining outcome is symmetric.
B. Uniform or Different Policies0
Suppose the two regions are committed to uniform policies should they ever reach an agreement. In the model, this requires that d = 0 in any offer. Then, the bargaining outcome is simple: A immediately suggests an agreement, and B immediately accepts, whatever are their types. Although the regions could demonstrate bargaining power by delaying or proposing g < 1, this is not attractive, since the regions have to contribute by the same amount in any case. No type desires to imitate another type, so there is no delay. With uniform policies and no side payments, the unique sequential equilibrium outcome is thus (d, t) = (0, 0).
We can use the results above to characterize the expected and discounted utility. In the case of uniform and differentiated policies, respectively, this can be written as
The fractions 1/4, , and /2 are the probabilities that the regions are both low types, both high types, or different types, respectively. The parentheses contain the total utility in each case, discounted appropriately. By comparison, differentiation provides costs as well as benefits. The potential benefit is that the region with the highest value of clean air will reduce its emission most. The cost is that such an agreement is delayed. It is useful to define the expected value as 2 13 In addition, the high type ends up contributing more because it benefits more from its own local contribution. This is particularly important if the externality is small, which explains why d' decreases in e.
14 "The rules for international law allow countries to withdraw from an international treaty, at least after giving sufficient notice; and, as to reaffirm this freedom, nearly all treaties include an explicit provision for withdrawal" (Scott The intuition is as follows. If the externality e is low, it is beneficial that the high-type region cleans more, since this will imply that the air is cleaner where this is more appreciated. Thus, the differentiation following from the bargaining game is valuable. If e /2, however, it is of less importance where cleaning is located, since the amount of clean air will, in any case, be similar in both regions. The value of differentiation is then low. If e > V2, it is optimal that the low-type region contributed more. In equilibrium, however, the high-type region ends up contributing more, since it has the lower bargaining power. Requiring harmonization would then clearly be better. Overall, a larger e decreases the benefit from differentiation (9). The delays (6)-(7) increase: as e increases, each region benefits more from the other region's contribution, and the high type becomes more tempted to imitate the low type's strategy. To signal bargaining power credibly, delay must increase. In sum: if e increases, uniformity becomes better relative to differentiation.
As noticed, it is necessary that e < 1/2 for differentiation to be good. If v then increases, there is an increase in the gains from cleaning domestically, and the high-type region becomes less tempted to signal bargaining power. Consequently, the delay decreases, and differentiation becomes better relative to uniformity.
If the heterogeneity h becomes larger, differentiation becomes more valuable and, thus, better relative to uniformity.
The chain of causation is admittedly somewhat more complex: if e, h, or v changes, so does the amount of equilibrium differentiation d'. And when d' changes, so do both the cost (the delay) and the benefit (the amount) of differentiation. In As issue linkages and logrolling become intrinsic in the political debate, some kind of side payments between regions can be included and maybe not excluded from the bargaining agenda. As already noticed, side payments can also be achieved by negotiating federal taxes differing (instead of being uniform) across regions. Thus, this section returns to the original problem in Section I by letting the regions negotiate side payments as well as policy differentiation.
The Pareto frontier of a final agreement is drawn in Figure 1 
Instead, A delays to t' before proposing (D, s).
A high-type B immediately accepts. A low-type B rejects A's offer and delays to t' before it counteroffers (0, 0), which A immediately accepts. If e > 1/2, the behavior is similar, but now a low-type region suggests that it will make the largest contribution itself. Naturally, the side payment to the low-type region must then be larger (s > s). Just as in the previous section, the outcome is fair in that it is identical to the outcome if information were complete: the policy is optimally differentiated and the side payments are such that both regions benefit equally from the agreement.
The side payment consists of two parts. The first is a transfer from the high-type to the low-type region, since the latter has more bargaining power. This would take place even with no differentiation (D = 0). The second part is a transfer to compensate the region that contributes most. If e < V2, the high-type region should clean most and the two parts have opposite signs. The first dominates if D is small, and s is then positive. If D is large, the second part dominates and there is a net transfer from the low-type to the high-type region. If e > V2, the low type cleans most and both parts imply a transfer from the high-type to the low-type region (s > 0).
Just as in the previous section, a low-type region delays to signal its bargaining power credibly. A high-type region finds the low-type region's strategy unattractive for two reasons. As before, a high-type region is less patient and cannot afford a delay. Second, imitating the low type would imply inefficient differentiation. If e < V2 and s < 0, for example, the low-type region pays the other region to contribute most. A high-type region has a lower willingness to pay for such a "trade." Thus, a region signals its type by proposing a certain "direction of trade." If D 1 -2eI is large, the gains from efficient trade are large, the high type is little tempted to imitate the low type, and the necessary delay to separate the two types is small. If D\1 -2e While Proposition 4 says that differentiation is better whenever side payments must be on the agenda, it does not imply that differentiation is good whenever side payments can be part of the agenda. It may be beneficial to prohibit both side payments and differentiation, since this ensures zero delay: PROPOSITION 5: u0 > uds if and only if both DI1 -2eK < 1 and (15) hold. This is more likely if the heterogeneity h is small, the possibility to differentiate D small, and 11/2 -el small: side payments. In federal unions, side payments may be prevented by a constitution that requires tax rates to be uniform across regions. In evaluating these alternatives, it is necessary to ask whether side payments are good. Figure 1 illustrates the traditional justification for side payments. There are gains from trade, in the sense that the policy is optimally differentiated in equilibrium, while side payments are used to compensate the region that contributes most. In addition, the previous section showed that a region can signal its type by the proposed direction of trade, thus reducing the need to signal by delay.
There is, however, a third effect. Without side payments, the value of bargaining power is limited by the possibilities of differentiating policy (3). With side payments available, a lowtype region may force a high-type region to pay in side payments what it cannot pay in politics. Then, bargaining power pays off more when side payments are available, and imitating the low-type's strategy becomes more tempting. There are then stronger incentives to signal bargaining power, which might outweigh the reduced necessity to use delay as a signaling device. This is certainly the case if D -0, since Proposition 5 implies that uo > us. The general conclusion requires a comparison between ud and uds. PROPOSITION 6: ud > uds if and only if D is small, the externality e small, and the value v large. If e 1/2 , the exact condition is given by (16):
To understand the general intuition for the result, first consider the case without side payments. If v is large and e small, the high type is quite happy to clean locally since it acquires most of the benefits itself (since e is small) and these benefits are large (since v is large). It is not very tempting to delay just to contribute less; the conflict of interest is low, and so is delay (6)-(7). If, in addition, D is small, there is not much to fight over anyway. Introducing side payments destroys the peace. Then, the low type requires side payments from the high type, the incentives to signal bargaining power increase as does delay. Therefore, in this case, side payments are bad. In the opposite case (v is low but e and D are large), there is already a great deal of conflict and delay without side payments. In equilibrium, transfers will be used to compensate the region that contributes most. Proposing to pay to contribute less is a credible signaling device, making delay less necessary. Moreover, there are gains from trade (unless the policy is first-best differentiated without side payments), which increase in D. Thus, if D is large, e large, and v small, side payments are beneficial.
The intuition is particularly simple if e 0 1/2. Suppose that ( (uo > ud) when the externality is large while the heterogeneity and the value of the public good are low. Section III compared the bargaining agendas in the second row. With side payments, differentiation is always good (uds > us), but it would be better to prohibit both side payments and differentiation (uO > uds) if the externality is large, heterogeneity low, and the possibility to differentiate small. The comparison between the rows, in Section IV, revealed that it is efficient to prohibit side payments (ud > uds) if the externality and the possibility to differentiate are small, while the value of the agreement is large; uo > us follows as a corollary. While both differentiation and side payments make the negotiations flexible and tie the policy to local conditions, they create conflicts of interest and, thus, delay. Notice that the two are complements: with side payments, differentiation is always good; without differentiation, side payments are always bad.
B. Decentralization or Centralization0
Ministers or Heads of State 0
As mentioned in the introduction, whether side payments and differentiation are possible may depend on the institutions. Side payments can be allowed or prohibited, respectively, by allocating control to the head of government or a minister with less discretion over other policies. While decentralized cooperation does not imply uniformity, centralization does, under the standard uniformity assumption. With this interpretation, uo > ud implies that centralization is better than decentralizing to local ministers; u > uds means that centralization is better than decentralizing to local heads of governments; while ud > uds states that local ministers should be in charge rather than the heads of local governments. Together, the results locate the optimal allocation of authority depending on the externality, the heterogeneity, and the value of the agreement.
As compared to the traditional literature (e.g., Oates 1972), certain results are confirmed: centralization is better if heterogeneity is low and the externality large. If the value of the public good is large, differentiation is optimal. More important issues should thus be decentralized, since the regions bargain over these efficiently, just as in Peter Klibanoff and Jonathan Morduch (1995). In contrast to the literature, however, the existence of asymmetric information is an argumentfor centralization. If information were complete, differentiation would be first-best, as would decentralized coordination. With asymmetric information, instead, decentralized coordination is inefficient and centralization may be better.19 Moreover, the central government's uniform policy is not a drawback, calling for more decentralization (as normally argued). Quite the opposite; it is uniformity that makes the case for centralization, since it reduces the costs of reaching an agreement.
C. The Uniformity Assumption:
A Theoretical Foundation
Since the bargaining equilibrium above is unique and in separating strategies, differentiation and side payments will always be requested '9 A related trade-off is studied by Patrick Bolton and Joseph Farrell (1990). Decentralizing firms' entry in a market leads to delay, but the most efficient firm is likely to enter first. A clumsy government, they assume, will immediately but randomly pick one firm.
by a low-type region whenever possible.20 Thus, characterizing the best bargaining agenda is relevant only if the regions can precommit to this before learning their own types. One way of committing may be to use trigger strategies in frequent interaction, where regions stick to the agenda to sustain future cooperation. This can be achieved, for example, by a norm against using cash to settle trade agreements. A more formal way of committing is to write treaties or a constitution, calling for harmonized policies for certain issues. Either way, regions constituting a federal union should be better able to commit to uniform policies when this is beneficial. Hence, the theory predicts more uniformity between regions that form a federal union than between regions that do not, and politician integration should lead to more uniformity. The analysis above thus provides a theoretical foundation for the uniformity assumption, and characterizes when it is likely to hold.
VI. Robustness
To keep the analysis concise and tractable, the model is as simple as possible. The results continue to hold, however, in more general models. For example, the model can easily be extended to allow for heterogeneity in externalities, cleaning costs, type-sets, or probabilities of being low types. Any bargaining game is just an example of how negotiations may proceed, and it is important to ask whether the results would hold under different procedures. The assumption that proposal power is alternating is quite standard. By relaxing the assumption that a region must make its offer at a particular time, however, I indirectly assume that the opponent cannot revise its previous offer in this interval. This is in line with Admati and Perry (1987) and Cramton (1992) , and their justifications for this assumption are discussed in Section IB. Nevertheless, what would happen if this assumption were relaxed0
On the one hand, the equilibrium described above would cease to exist. As soon as B starts delaying, A realizes that B is a low type, and A is tempted to revise its offer accordingly. Anticipating a revised offer, B would delay even if it were a high type, delay would not be a credible signal, and there would be no equilibrium in pure strategies. Negotiations would lead to a war of attrition, where each negotiator hopes that the opponent gives in by making the next offer, thereby revealing its impatience. This situation arises in the model by Cramton (1992) , who assumes that either negotiator can make the first offer. In equilibrium, reluctant negotiators delay longer to signal their types, just as in my model. In the discrete-type model, however, a war of attrition requires mixed strategies and the welfare analysis becomes overly complicated.
On the other hand, the results would remain identical by adding one assumption. Suppose that, instead of delaying to time t, a region could (permanently and credibly) downsize the project from g = 1 to some 't < 1. A region could then signal its type by proposing a less ambitious project, g < 1, instead of using delay. This would credibly signal reluctance, since it is more costly for the high type than for the low type to downsize the project: the utility functions fulfill the single-crossing condition in the space (d, g). The results above would be identical by just reinterpreting the discount factor 6' as size g of the project.
As revealed by this discussion, the bargaining procedure is important. It is thus worthwhile to abstract from particular procedures and instead study limitations that must hold for all procedures in our context. Since any bargaining game can be replicated by a truthful mechanism where each region announces its type, define the As argued in Section IIA, it may be necessary to require the outcome to be fair, since one region would otherwise request renegotiation. And, to ensure robustness, Robert  Wilson (1985, 1101) argues that mechanisms should "not rely on features of the agents' common knowledge, such as their probability assessments." In our context, this is equivalent to requiring the mechanism to be implementable in dominant strategies, or that honest revelation is an ex post equilibrium. With these two restrictions, no procedure can do better than the equilibria above. Roughly speaking, a sequential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982 ) is a set of strategies and beliefs such that after every history, each player's strategy is optimal, given its beliefs and the other player's strategy, and the beliefs are consistent with Bayes's rule. The intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps 1987 ) is a refinement restricting the beliefs outside the equilibrium. In essence, it requires that any action out of equilibrium that is beneficial for exactly one type implies that beliefs place probability one on this type. For the case without side payments, this may be defined as follows: 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
The proof is quite similar to the proof of Proposition 1, so only the key differences will be mentioned. The relevant concepts are defined in the analogous way. If information were complete, the unique sequential equilibrium would be given by Proposition 3 with no delay: this can be shown as a similar reasoning to that of Rubinstein (1982) . As previously, no pooling equilibrium exists, so the attention can be restricted to separating equilibria.
Suppose that e ,1/2, and that A is revealed to be of low type by making an offer at t'. A high-type B will be unable to convince A that B is of low type, and 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7:
Requiring the outcome to be "fair" means that d and (d, s) should be equal to the outcome if information were complete, i.e., as in Proposition 1 and 3, respectively. All participation constraints are then fulfilled. Requiring strategies to be dominant means that the incentive constraints should hold whatever type the opponent announces, or even when the opponent's type is known. I will now calculate the most efficient mechanism given these constraints. Let to, t1, and t2 denote the time of the settlement when, respectively, neither, one, and both regions announce low type. Since the game is symmetric, t1 will not depend on which of the regions announces low type.
With differentiation but no side payments, the problem is (IC) and (IC) are the high type's incentive constraints when the other region announces high and low type, respectively. Both (IC) and (IC) must hold in an ex post equilibrium. It is easily checked that
